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I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose you are an avid Stephen King enthusiast and seek to pur-
chase a copy of his recently released novella, RIDING THE BULLET.'
After poking your head in a few bricks and mortar stores and doing a
little internet surfing, you soon realize that RIDING THE BULLET was not
* Victor F. Calaba is an incoming associate at the law firm of Gray Cary Ware &
Freidenrich, LLP in Palo Alto, California.
1. STEPHEN KING, RIDING THE BULLET (2000).
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released in hard-copy form but rather was released exclusively as a digi-
tal eBook that can only be purchased online.
Not too familiar with this format, you decide to give it a try. You
visit www.SimonSays.com (Simon and Schuster's website), add RIDING
THE BULLET to your shopping cart, charge it to your credit card and then
download the eBook to the hard drive of your desktop PC. You also
download Adobe Acrobat eBook Reader, the software necessary to read
RIDING THE BULLET on your computer. As you click on the icon to in-
stall the reader software you just downloaded, an end-user license
agreement pops up, requiring you to click the "Yes" box, stating that you
agree to the terms of the license agreement.
Once downloaded onto your Windows PC, suppose you want to
transfer RIDING THE BULLET to your other computer, which happens to
be an Apple iBook laptop. In the alternative, suppose you finish reading
the eBook and want to donate it to your local library or resell it on eBay.
Given the restrictions programmed into Adobe's eBook software, you
will find that the desired actions are functionally infeasible. Further,
should you attempt to crack the eBook reader software so RIDING THE
BULLET can be read on your iBook or so the local library can open the
copy you tried to transmit, you will be violating the license agreement
you consented to as well as acting unlawfully under the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act (hereinafter "DMCA").2
What happened to the privileges you have traditionally enjoyed un-
der the 1976 Copyright Act (the "Copyright Act"), you ask? Why could
you resell or donate that hardbound version of DON QUIXOTE but can't
do the same with the eBook you just purchased online? Whereas the first
sale doctrine historically permitted the transfer and resale of copyrighted
works, license agreements used by software companies and the DMCA's
strict rules prohibiting tampering with access control devices frustrate
exercise of the first sale doctrine with respect to many forms of digital
works.
The use of eBooks is one of many instances where functional and
legal impediments prevent exercise of the first sale doctrine. Other sce-
narios include the resale of installation disks for software that contains
encryption permitting only one installation per purchase; the transfer of
software you installed after purchasing it on the internet or in a brick and
mortar store; the transfer of software that came preinstalled on your new
computer; and reinstallation of your Windows operating system without
being able to find the product key shipped with the software.
Enacted in 1998 to protect copyright in the digital era, the DMCA
mandated that the Register of Copyrights and the Assistant Secretary for
2. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2001).
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Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce sub-
mit to Congress no later than two years after the DMCA's enactment a
report evaluating the DMCA.3 Accordingly, on June 5, 2000, the United
States Copyright Office solicited comments from interested parties on
the effects of the DMCA and the development of electronic commerce
and associated technology on the operation of Sections 109 (the first sale
doctrine) and 117 (Computer Maintenance Competition Assurance Act)
of the Copyright Act, and the relationship between existing and emergent
technology and the operation of those sections.
Compiling responses to these questions and providing an analysis of
the issues at hand, the Copyright Office prepared the DMCA Section 104
Report and delivered it to Congress in August of 2001 . While the first
sale doctrine has always been a point of contention between copyright
owners and copyright users, unparalleled tension between these parties
currently exists. On the one hand lays copyright owners' concerns about
protecting their intellectual property. On the other is the public's desire
to apply traditional first sale privileges to digital works. Overarching
both of these positions is a technological landscape presenting piracy
concerns never before seen in the history of copyright.
This article explores the first sale doctrine as it pertains to digital
works and proposes ways to make a digital first sale doctrine feasible.
Part II describes the first sale doctrine as it has traditionally been applied
to non-digital works. Part III discusses modern technology's impact on
the distribution and use of copyrighted material. Part IV explores the
means by which the first sale doctrine has grown inapplicable to digital
works, addressing the use of license agreements, uncertainty as to the
Copyright Act, and the DMCA provisions that render the first sale doc-
trine incompatible with digital works. Part V discusses the impacts on
commerce resulting from frustration of the first sale doctrine. Part VI
suggests technological methods to protect copyright owners' interests if
a digital first sale doctrine were enacted. Part VII concludes by arguing
that Congress should implement a digital first sale doctrine.
II. THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE As TRADITIONALLY
APPLIED To NON-DIGITAL WORKS
Under the Copyright Act, copyright owners enjoy six exclusive
rights: reproduction, preparation of derivative works, distribution, public
3. 17 U.S.C. § 104(b) (2001).
4. US Copyright Office, DMCA Section 104 Report (Aug. 2001) (hereinafter Section
104 Report).
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performance, public display, and digital transmission performance The
first sale doctrine, as codified in Section 109 of the Copyright Act, limits
a copyright owner's distribution right such that he can exploit the copy-
righted work only through the point of first sale.6 The first sale doctrine
serves to balance copyright owners' rights with the public's interest in
trading and alienating works and allows users, in effect, to partially par-
ticipate in the distribution of copyrighted material. Under the doctrine,
after the first sale has occurred, subsequent owners lawfully obtaining
the work may freely alienate it.'
It is the first sale exception that has historically permitted owners of
CDs, books and records to resell the works, give them to friends and
family or donate them to libraries.8 It is also the first sale exception that
enables used CD stores and bookstores, such as Amazon.com's Z-shops,
to capture the entire gain from reselling used versions of copyrighted
works without having to share any of the money with the authors or pub-
lishers.9 Finally, the first sale doctrine lets libraries freely lend books to
anyone with a library card, again without any residual payment obliga-
tions to the author or publisher.'
The first sale exception originated from a judicially created doctrine
rooted in the policy of prohibiting restraints on alienation of tangible
property." In 1908, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the first sale doctrine
in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,"2 holding that although a copyright owner
had an exclusive right to reproduce a copyrighted work, the owner could
not restrict the market for resale of the work by imposing mandatory
price constraints. 3
5. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1999),
6. Section 109(a) states in relevant part: "Notwithstanding the provisions of section
106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any
person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to
sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord." 17 U.S.C. § 109(a)
(1994).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1999).
8. Julie Hilden, Letting Public Libraries Down: The Recent Copyright Office Report
Misses A Chance to Support A Digital First Sale Doctrine for Libraries, at
http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/hilden/20010906.html (Sept. 6, 2001).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Section 104 report, supra note 4, at 20.
12. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). In Bobbs-Merrill, the plaintiff
copyright owner of a book placed the following notice in copies of the book: "[t]he price of
this book at retail is one dollar net. No dealer is licensed to sell it (the copies) at a less price,
and a sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the copyright." Id. at 341. The
defendant disregarded the plaintiff's notice and sold the books for eighty-nine cents. Id. at
342.
13. Id. at 350.
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One year following the Bobbs-Merrill decision, Congress codified
the first sale doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1909." Intending to bal-
ance a copyright owner's right to control distribution of his work with
the public's interest in alienating copies of the work, 5 Congress provided
for the following in Section 27 of the 1909 Copyright Act:
The copyright is distinct from property in the material object
copyrighted, and the sale or conveyance, by gift or otherwise, of
the material object shall not itself constitute a transfer of the
copyright, nor shall the assignment of the copyright constitute a
transfer of the title to the material object; but nothing in this title
shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any
copy of a copyrighted work the possession of which has been
lawfully obtained. 6
Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act preserves the 1909 statutory
first sale doctrine by establishing a two-prong test.'7 In order to receive
the privileges of the first sale doctrine in an infringement suit, the defen-
dant must establish both prongs.'8 First, the defendant must own the copy
of the work in question (e.g., a DVD, CD, book, etc.).' 9 Ownership can
be achieved either by virtue of a sale, gift, bequest or other transfer of
title. ° Ownership can also be achieved by nonconsensual transfer of title,
such as when a creditor acquires a work through a judicial sale or court-
compelled assignment.
2'
Because the first sale exception rests upon the principle that copy-
right owners receive full value for the work when it is first sold,22 people
with anything less than full "ownership" may not exercise the doctrine. 3
Merely possessing, works, therefore, "regardless of whether that posses-
sion is legitimate, such as by rental, or illegitimate, such as by theft' 24 is
insufficient for purposes of the first sale doctrine. A library patron that
steals a checked out book and then sells it, therefore, would not only be
converting the book itself, but would also be infringing the author's
copyright in the book.
14. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1999) (originally enacted as 17 U.S.C. § 27 (1977)).
15. Keith Kupferschmid, Lost in Cyberspace: the Digital Demise of the First-Sale Doc-
trine, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 825, 832 (1998).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 27 (1977) (corresponds to 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1999)).
17. Section 104 Report, supra note 4, at 22.
18. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1999).
19. id.
20. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.12[B][1]
(2002) (hereinafter "NIMMER"); Section 104 Report, supra note 4, at 22.
21. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 479 (4th ed. 1998).
22. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.6.1.1 (1989).
23. Id.
24. NIMMER, supra note 20, § 8.12[B][1]; Section 104 Report, supra note 4, at 23.
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The first sale doctrine's second prong requires that the defendant's
copy have been lawfully made.25 The copyright owner or the law, there-
fore, must have authorized the making of the copy in question.2 6 Illegal
copies, regardless of whether or not the owner has knowledge of piracy,
do not receive the benefit of the first sale doctrine.27 An unsuspecting
holder of a pirated CD, therefore, cannot legally resell it to a used CD
store without violating the copyright owner's distribution right.
A. Limitations on the First Sale Doctrine
The first sale doctrine has several important limitations. First, the
doctrine applies only to the distribution right.29 It does not protect users
from liability in instances involving unauthorized reproduction, public
performance, or adaptation of a copyrighted work.3° Thus, even though
the first sale doctrine may permit the resale of a copyrighted work, a per-
son could face copyright infringement liability for reproducing, publicly
performing or adapting the work without authority.3'
Second, the first sale doctrine permits transfers only with respect to
the "particular" copy of the work in a person's possession. 2 The doctrine
grants no rights to the user in the work itself.33 Thus, while a person
could resell his copy of a book, he has no rights to copies of the work
owned by others nor to any rights in the story reflected on the book's
34pages.
The final limitation exhibits Congress' fear of applying the first sale
doctrine in instances where practical circumstances threaten the ability
of a copyright owner to receive full value for sale of a work.3' As codi-
fied in Section 109(b) of the Copyright Act, owners of phonorecords and
software may not dispose of such works via rental, lease or lending.36
Section 109(b) is the statutory response to concerns that the rental of
sound recordings and software permitted users to inexpensively rent
25. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1999).
26. NIMMER, supra note 20, § 8.12[B][4]; Section 104 Report, supra note 4, at 23.
27. Id.
28. Kupferschmid, supra note 15, at 833.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1999).
30. Kupferschmid, supra note 15, at 833.
31. Id.
32. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1999).
33. Kupferschmid, supra note 15, at 833.
34. Id.
35. See Goldstein, supra note 22, at 601-03.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1999).
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works and then make an illegal copy, thereby reducing purchases of new
works.37.
III. MODERN TECHNOLOGY'S IMPACT ON COPYRIGHT
Modem technology affects our daily lives in innumerable ways, in-
cluding how we work, communicate, consume goods and services, and
relax.1 The growth rate of e-commerce is staggering. Whereas in the
fourth quarter of 1999 retail e-commerce sales were $5.48 billion,
$11.17 billion in e-commerce sales were generated in the fourth quarter
of 2001, an increase of 104% over the two-year period.39 Further, accord-
ing to estimates made in 2000 by Forrester Research, online business-to-
consumer sales of digitally downloaded products will increase from
$100 million, or 3% of all online sales in 2000 to $2.9 billion, or 22% of
total online sales by 2004.40 The most dramatic growth in digitally-
downloaded products will likely be in the music sector, where sales from
digital downloads could rise from one-million dollars, or .1% of all
online music sales in 1999 to one billion dollars, or 25% of all music
sold online by 2004, followed by software (rising from $87 million, or
7% of all online software sales to $1.3 billion, or 40% by 2004) and digi-
tal books (rising from $12 million, or 1% of online sales in 1999 to $426
million, or 13% of all online book sales by 2004).'
While modem technology presents innumerable benefits, including
ease of access to and rapid transmission of information, it poses consid-
erable challenges to traditional copyright law. Modern technological
developments drastically alter the methods by which copyrighted works
are used as well as disrupt the economics of prior distribution models.
Due to the ease of pirating copyrighted works, digital technology poten-
tially exposes copyright owners to tremendous losses.
In the past, pirates found it difficult to duplicate and distribute copy-
righted works. A century ago the only way to copy a book was to own a
printing press or hand copy the work, both requiring considerable skill,
37. See S. REP. NO. 98-162, at 4 (1983) (noting that "[t]he first sale doctrine was origi-
nally adopted by the courts to give effect to the early common law rule against restraints on
alienation of tangible property ... The Committee concludes that the first sale doctrine was
never intended to allow or to sanction commercial record rentals which lead inevitably to
widespread and unauthorized home taping.").
38. National Telecommunication and Information Administration DMCA Rep., at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/occ/dmca200l/l04gdmca.htm (March 2001).
39. See U.S. Census Bureau, Economics and Statistics Administration, Fourth Quarter
2001 Release, at http://www.census.gov/mrts/www/current.html (last revised Nov. 22, 2002).
40. Forrester Research, Spectacular Growth for Digital Delivery, Nua Internet Surveys,
at http://www.nua.com/surveys/index.cgi?f=VS&artid=905355577&rel=true (Feb. 7, 2000).
41. Id.
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money and time.42 Once copied, distributing the book was equally labor
intensive, involving physical delivery of each copy to its destination.
Distribution of traditional works thus involved numerous transaction
costs that were in most instances directly proportional to the size of the
work and the geographic distance between the distributor and the recipi-
ent. Such impediments to piracy continued throughout history until even
as recently as the last decade. While technology available in the 1980s
such as the photocopier and VCR reduced the cost, skill and time re-
quired to pirate a book or movie, distribution of the pirated material still
involved costly physical delivery of each copy.
Modern day pirates have a much easier job. Unlike traditional copy-
righted material, digitized works can be readily and mass copied by the
effortless stroke of a key or click of a mouse. Once copied, users can log
onto the internet and share files with their neighbors as well as with peo-
ple located on different sides of the globe for the same virtually free
price. Limited only by the speed of one's internet connection, users can
distribute unlimited quantities of pirated copies to a virtually unlimited
number of users.
Further, copying digital files does not result in degradation of the
file's quality.43 Thus, unlike the limited life of a book or a cassette that
erodes with each use, a digital file, barring accidental erasure or corrup-
tion from a virus, can be used indefinitely." Once transferred, a copy
exists in perpetuity and permanently threatens to dilute the value of the
original work.4
Finally, the compactness of works in digital form presents new con-
cerns.4 6 Digitized works "are essentially an invisible string of stored
electrical voltages (the high voltage corresponding to an encoded '1,' the
low to '0,' which are binary representations of the individual elements of
the work, whether they be letters or numbers or a point on a bit map). 47
Unlike traditional media, which required vast storage space, the contents
of an entire library can be stored on a single hard drive if converted to
digital form. 48 A billion bits of data occupying merely one gigabyte of
hard-drive space would require a stack of paper three stories tall if it
were to be typed in double spaced format.49 Users can thus maintain
42. Pamela Samuelson, Digital Media and The Changing Face of Intellectual Property
Law, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 323, 324 (1990).
43. Kupferschmid, supra note 15, at 848.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. Samuelson, supra note 42, at 334.
47. Id.




mass quantities of digitized works, thereby increasing the pool from
which works can be accessed and selected for piracy.
These attributes not only facilitate piracy but also undermine the
ability of copyright law to prevent and deter it. Given that in most cases
computers are required to enjoy works in digital format, each user has
the proverbial printing press at his disposal." Gone are the days where a
copyright owner could successfully eradicate piracy by focusing his ef-
forts on shutting down renegade printing presses that were already scarce
due to the time, expense and skill they required to operate." Now, every
person with a computer has the ability to pirate copyrighted works in his
living room and transmit them anywhere in the world at the touch of a
key.
IV WHY THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE CEASES TO ExIST
WITH RESPECT TO DIGITAL WORKS
Why doesn't the first sale doctrine apply to the copy of RIDING THE
BULLET you purchased? A combination of three factors limits applica-
tion of the first sale doctrine to digital works: first, license agreements
imposed by software manufacturers typically prohibit exercise of the
first sale doctrine; second, traditional copyright law may not support ap-
plication of the first sale doctrine to digital works; finally, the DMCA
functionally prevents users from making copies of digitized works and
prohibits the necessary bypassing of access control mechanisms to facili-
tate a transfer.
A. License Agreements Limit Application
of the First Sale Doctrine
Responding to a landscape fraught with danger for copyright own-
ers, the software industry turned to contract law in its sales of software
to avert unauthorized copying. Rather cleverly, software companies at-
tempted to structure the purchase of software as the grant of a license
rather than a sale that transferred ownership.5 2 Titled "shrink-wrap li-
censes" because they were deemed executed upon the consumer's
opening of the shrink-wrap around the box containing the software,53 the
50. Id. at 326.
51. Id. at 327.
52. As an example, the click-wrap license agreement accompanying Microsoft Reader
2.1 states "The software product is licensed, not sold."
53. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1239, 1241-42 (1995). A typical shrink-wrap license states the following: "[Vendor] is
providing the enclosed materials to you on the express condition that you assent to this soft-
ware license. By using any of the enclosed diskette(s), you agree to the following provisions.
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license typically "imposes restrictions on use, reproduction, transfer and
modification of the software program by the consumer."54 Similar li-
censes, called "click-wrap" and "web-wrap" licenses, require users to
click the "Yes" box at the bottom of the license agreement before permit-
ting installation of software purchased in a store or over the internet.
5
The use of such licenses attempts to accomplish two objectives.
First, it provides software makers with contract remedies in addition to
copyright law remedies when users breach license agreements by pirat-
ing or making unauthorized copies. Second, shrink-wrap licenses
attempt to eliminate the first sale doctrine by reducing a copyright user's
status from that of owner to a mere possessor, thereby rendering the user
unable to meet the doctrine's ownership requirement. 6 By preventing the
ability of users to transfer licensed works, software firms alleviate con-
cerns that used versions of the work might displace purchases of new
versions.
Shrink-wrap licenses, however, fail to entirely serve their objectives.
The licenses have become widely ignored by users who copy and share
the software with others in spite of the license terms. 7 As for attempting
to preclude consumers from exercising the first sale doctrine, the legal
profession considered shrink-wrap licenses and their progeny "largely, if
not completely, unenforceable."' Many courts deemed transactions in-
volving shrink-wrap licenses sales rather than licenses, 9 thereby
preserving application of the first sale doctrine to the work. The courts
held that in order to qualify as a valid license and legally exclude first
sale privileges, the licensee must sign the agreement rather than click the
"Yes" box.
60
The use of license agreements to abrogate consumers' rights raised
concerns that the software industry was obtaining too much power and
becoming unduly repressive. In response to these issues, Representatives
Rick Boucher (R-VA) and Thomas Campbell (R-CA) proposed H.R.
If you do not agree with these license provisions, return these materials to your dealer, in
original packaging within three days from receipt, for a refund" Daniel J. Caffarelli, Crossing
Virtual Lines: Trespass on the Internet, 5 B.U. J. Sci. & T CH. L. 6, at 35 (1997) (quoting
language from license agreement at issue in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255,
257 n.2 (5th Cir. 1988)).
54. Batya Goodman, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink Wrap Agree-
ment as An Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 319, 332 (1999).
55. See id. at 334.
56. See Goodman, supra note 54, at 332.
57. See Samuelson, supra note 42, at 327-28.
58. Id.
59. See e.g., Vault Co. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
60. See MARY BRANDT JENSEN, DOES YOUR PROJECT HAVE A COPYRIGHT PROBLEM?: A
DECISION-MAKING GUIDE FOR LIBRARIANS 77 (1996).
[Vol. 9:1
Quibbles 'n Bits
3048 to the 105th Congress.6 ' Entitled the Digital Era Copyright En-
forcement Act, the controversial bill aimed to prevent copyright owners
from using nonnegotiable license terms to revoke or narrow rights and
usage privileges otherwise allowed under the Copyright Act.62
While Congress did not enact H.R. 3048, the bill would have ren-
dered unenforceable non-negotiable license terms that "limit the
reproduction, adaptation, distribution, performance, or display, by means
of transmission or otherwise, of material that is uncopyrightable ... or
[terms that] abrogate or restrict the limitations on exclusive rights speci-
fied in sections 107 through 114 and sections 117 and 118."63 Essentially,
the bill would have overruled ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,64 a seventh cir-
cuit case upholding the enforceability of a shrink-wrap license that
prohibited the copying of uncopyrightable telephone book listings.65 In
addition, the bill would have eradicated the software industry's practice
of using license agreements to reduce fair use rights and first sale privi-
leges.
B. Confusion as to Whether the First Sale
Doctrine Applies to Digital Works
On its face, the first sale doctrine as codified in the Copyright Act
does not distinguish between digital and non-digital works. 66 Strong ar-
guments exist on both sides of the spectrum as to whether the first sale
doctrine applies to digital works.
a. Arguments that the First Sale Doctrine Does
Not Apply to Digital Works
Three arguments assert that the first sale doctrine does not apply to
digital works. First, transmitting a digitized work to another user re-
quires that the transferor make a duplicate of the original copy, which is
then passed on to the recipient.6 ' As a result of the copying necessary to
facilitate the transfer of digitized works, the copyright owner's reproduc-
tion right may be implicated-a right to which the first sale exception
does not apply.
6 8
61. Digital Era Copyright Enhancement Act, H.R. 3048, 105th Cong. (1997).
62. See Introduction of the Digital Era Enforcement Act, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement
of Rep. Boucher), available at http://rs9.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/Cr I 05:./temp/-rI O5HPoOy4
(last visited May 6, 2002).
63. Digitai Era Copyright Enhancement Act, supra note 61, § 7.
64. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
65. Id.
66. 117 U.S.C. 109.
67. Kupferschmid, supra note 15, at 838.
68. Id.
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How the duplicate copy is stored on the recipient's computer poten-
tially impacts the analysis of whether the creation of a copy has
occurred. If the file is stored in the computer's Read Only Memory
("ROM"), 69 then it is held in the computer's memory for an indefinite
period of time.7° If a user saves a file such as an MP3 in his computer's
hard drive, the file remains stored until it is deleted. If, however, rather
than downloading the MP3 the user merely clicks on a link enabling him
to hear a streaming version of the song, the work is stored in the com-
puter's Random Access Memory ("RAM"). Unlike ROM or a hard drive,
RAM is a temporary storage medium that retains data only until the pro-
gram using the data is closed or the computer is switched off.7 '
Whether reproduction of a copyrighted work made in a computer's
hard drive, ROM or RAM falls within the Copyright Act's definition of
"copies" requires a close examination of the statute and caselaw. If, in
transmitting a copyrighted work to a friend under the first sale doctrine,
the duplicate copy created qualifies as a "copy" under the Copyright Act,
then the process infringes the copyright owner's exclusive reproduction
right.72 Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines "copies" as: "[M]aterial
objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device.
73
Starting with the most ephemeral of the three storage media, RAM
chips are "electronic integrated circuits, etched and deposited on a wafer
of semiconducting material (such as silicon), which are capable of stor-
ing binary information in the form of electrical impulses. 74 As such,
there is little question as to whether a RAM chip is a "material object. 75
With the aid of a computer, works stored in RAM can be "perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated. 76 Of critical importance, there-
fore, is whether a reproduction made in RAM is "fixed."77
69. Unlike RAM, once data has been written onto a ROM chip, it cannot be removed and
can only be read. Webopedia, at http://www.webopedia.com/Term/r/rom.html (last visited
Dec. 01, 2002). ROM typically stores critical programs such as the program that boots the
computer, and also stores data associated with printers such as fonts. Id.
70. See Section 104 Report, supra note 4, at 107; see also Apple Computer v. Formula
Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617, 621-22 (Dist.Ct.C.D.Cal. 1984).
71. See Section 104 Report, supra note 4, at 107-08.
72. See 17 U.S.C. 106.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1999).
74. Section 104 Report, supra note 4, at 109.





Section 101 of the Copyright Act provides clarification as to whether
a work is "fixed" by requiring that the embodiment of the work in a copy
be "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration."78 While intuitively a copy made into the RAM of a computer
would seem to lack the requisite permanence and thus fail to qualify as a
"copy," the Federal Government and much of the copyright community
concludes that RAM copies are "fixed" in a manner sufficient to qualify
as a copy for the purposes of the law.7 9 The executive branch, in a report
entitled "Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastruc-
ture,"80 clarified its position on the issue by stating "when a work is
placed into a computer, whether on a disk, diskette, ROM, or other stor-
age device or in RAM for more than a very brief period, a copy is
made."
The legislative branch takes a similar position, asserting that "be-
cause works in a computer storage may be repeatedly reproduced, they
are fixed and, therefore, are copies. 82 Further, Congress' enactment of
Section 117 of the Copyright Act permitting users to make archival cop-
ies in RAM "necessary" to run a computer program may impliedly
confirm Congress' view that RAM copies are "fixed" for the purposes of
copyright law.83
The judiciary likewise holds that RAM copies fall within the Copy-
right Act's definition of copies. 4 Numerous cases have held that RAM
copies are sufficiently fixed.85 In 1993, the ninth circuit in MAI Computer
78. Id.
79. Kupferschmid, supra note 15, at 840.
80. BRUCE A. LEHMAN, Statement of Bruce A. Lehman on S. 1284 and H.R. 2441,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT
OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, available at http://
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/nii-hill.html (Sept. 1995).
81. Kupferschmid, supra note 15, at 841-42 (citing Lehman, supra note 80).
82. National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
("CONTU"), Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, tit. 2, 206(b), 88 Stat. 1873, codified
as amended in 2 U.S.C. § 206(b) (Supp. IV 1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6849.
83. Lemley, supra note 53, at 197.
84. Kupferschmid, supra note 15, at 843.
85. See e.g. Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, 847 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that "the act of load-
ing a program from a medium of storage into a computer's memory creates a copy of the
program"); Marobie-Fl., Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs. & Northwest Nexus, Inc.,
983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. 111. 1997); In Re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1537
(D. Kan. 1995); Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp.
356 (E.D. Va. 1994); Final Report of the National Commission on the New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works, at 13 (1978) (indicating that "the placement of a work into a
computer is the preparation of a copy"); NIMMER, supra note 20, § 8.08 (noting that
"[i]nputting a computer program entails the preparation of a copy.").
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Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. addressed this issue as it pertained
to the loading of diagnostic software into a computer's RAM.86 There,
the defendant owned a legitimate copy of plaintiff's software.87 In using
the software, defendant loaded it into the RAM of its clients' many com-
puters. Because the loading of plaintiff's software into a computer's
RAM enabled the defendant technicians to view the software's systems
error log, the court held that the RAM copy was "sufficiently permanent
or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise commu-
nicated for a period of more than transitory duration."88 Accordingly, the
court held that the loading of software into RAM creates a copy under
the Copyright Act.89
If the determination is correct that RAM copies are sufficiently
"fixed," then copies of works stored in a computer's ROM as well as
works stored on a hard drive should likewise qualify as "fixed" due to
the relative permanence of these media. The process of making a dupli-
cate copy of a work, therefore, even for a limited period of time,
implicates the copyright owner's reproduction right irrespective of how
the copy is transmitted and irrespective of whether the copy is stored in
the computer's hard drive, its ROM or its RAM. 90 The first sale doctrine
is not an exception to the reproduction right. Thus, lacking authorization
from the owner or any other exemption in the Copyright Act, the place-
ment of the duplicate copy into the receiving computer's memory would
constitute copyright infringement.9'
The second argument that the first sale doctrine does not apply to
digital works is that in transferring a digitized work, the user is not
transmitting her "particular" copy.92 Rather, the original copy remains on
the user's computer while the duplicate copy is sent to the recipient.93
This "second-generation" copy is clearly separate from the copy residing
on the transmitting computer.94 As such, the first sale doctrine's require-
86. MAI Computer Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
87. Id. at 519.
88. Id. at 518.
89. Id.
90. Kupferschmid, supra note 15, at 838.
91. Id.; The Section 104 Report, in addition to addressing a digital first sale doctrine and
fair use, addresses the issue of temporary buffer copies stored in RAM. Section 104 Report,
supra note 3, at 106-148. After conducting a fair use analysis and examining the interests at
hand, the Section 104 Report concludes by suggesting that "Congress enact legislation amend-
ing the Copyright Act to preclude any liability arising from the assertion of a copyright
owner's reproduction right with respect to temporary buffer copies that are incidental to a
licensed digital transmission of a public performance of a sound recording and any underlying
musical work." Id. at 142-43.
92. Kupferschmid, supra note 15, at 843.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 844-45.
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ment that the transmitted work be the user's particular copy is not satis-
fied when a digital work is transferred.
Finally, application of the exception to digital works could under-
mine the purpose of the first sale doctrine itself.95 The first sale exception
serves to promote the alienation and trade of copyrighted works while
balancing the commercial exploitation interests of the copyright owner.
9 6
Where the first sale exception has impaired the copyright owner's le-
gitimate interests in exploitation, Congress has limited the scope of the
doctrine codified in the Copyright Act. 97 Application of the first sale doc-
trine to digital works clearly creates potential for piracy that could
dramatically interfere with copyright owners' ability to commercially
exploit their works. As such, application of the first sale doctrine to digi-
tal works could upset the delicate balance historically achieved by the
first sale doctrine.
In addition to potentially interfering with the purpose of the first sale
doctrine, application of the exception to digital transmissions could in-
hibit rather than promote alienation and trade in copyrighted works.98
Because digital works can be readily copied, copyright owners may fear
piracy and limit distribution of their works to traditional methods. 99 A
reduction in the number of works released digitally would deny the pub-
lic of easy and instant access to works via the internet-the primary
benefit that modern technology presents. '°°
b. Arguments that the First Sale Doctrine Does Apply to Digital Works
Strong arguments can also be made that the first sale doctrine ap-
plies to digital works. The Library Associations'o° vigorously asserted
these views in their reply comments to the Copyright Office's solicita-
tions on the effects of the DMCA.' °2 The arguments take a broad
95. Id. at 852.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 852. See also discussion on § 109(b) of the Copyright Act, infra Part II.A.
98. Kupferschmid, supra note 15, at 852-53.
99. Id. at 853.
100. Id.
101. The library associations submitting reply comments regarding the DMCA included
the American Library Association, the American Association of Law Libraries, the Association
of Research Libraries, the Medical Library Association, and the Special Library Association.
See Index of Reply Comments: Joint Study on 17 U.S.C. Sections 109 and 117 Required Pur-
suant to DMCA Section 104, available at http://www.loc.gov/copyright/reports/studies/
dmca/reply/ (last modified Apr. 22, 2002).
102. Reply Comments of the Library Associations Before the Library of Congress, The
United States Copyright Office and The Department of Commerce, National Telecommunica-
tions and Information Administration, Washington, D.C., available at http://www.arl.org/info/
frn/copy/letter06050O.html (Sept. 5, 2000) (hereinafter "Reply Comments of Library Associa-
tions").
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approach, urging a more principled application of the Copyright Act and
first sale doctrine rather than a strict formalistic one.0 3 As stated by the
Library Associations, a "[f]ormalistic application of the exclusive repro-
duction right must not prevent consumers from utilizing new
technologies, and it must not prevent traditional user rights [such as the
first sale doctrine] from being replicated in new technological environ-
ments."' ' Supporting this position are United States Supreme Court
cases such as Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken' 5 and Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.,'" which illustrate the Supreme
Court's willingness to adapt the Copyright Act to technological changes.
The issue before the Supreme Court in Aiken provides a close anal-
ogy to the state of the first sale doctrine with respect to current
technology. There, plaintiff copyright owners sued a storeowner, alleging
that by receiving a radio station broadcast of plaintiffs' copyrighted
songs the storeowner infringed the plaintiffs' exclusive right to perform
the work themselves.' 7 In holding that the reception of a radio broadcast
by the storeowner did not infringe the copyright owners' performance
right, 108 the Court reasoned that while the legislative history of the 1909
Copyright Act aimed to prevent unauthorized performances of copy-
righted material in public places such as concert halls and theaters, "it
was never contemplated that the members of the audience who heard the
composition would themselves also be simultaneously 'performing,' and
thus also guilty of infringement. ' '°
The Aiken decision is of particular significance due to the manner in
which the court dealt with the implications of radio broadcast technology
on the performance right. In reconciling the new technology with the
seemingly incongruous statute, the court adapted the Copyright Act to
the circumstances at hand, stating:
[A] statute may be applied to new situations not anticipated by
Congress, if, fairly construed, such situations come within its in-
tent and meaning .... While statutes should not be stretched to
apply to new situations not fairly within their scope, they should
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 158 (1975).
106. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (stating
that "our inquiry cannot be limited to ordinary meaning and legislative history, for this is a
statute that was drafted long before the development of the electronic phenomena with which
we deal here .... In 1909 radio itself was in its infancy, and television had not been invented.
We must read the statutory language of 60 years ago in the light of drastic technological
change.").
107. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 153.
108. Id. at 162-64.
109. Id. at 157.
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not be so narrowly construed as to permit their evasion because
of changing habits due to new inventions and discoveries." °
Adhering to the court's reasoning in Aiken, the creation of digital
technology should not alter application of the Copyright Act. The first
sale doctrine aims to balance the reward to copyright owners with the
policy of promoting unrestricted alienability of property throughout so-
ciety. Although using modem technology to transmit a digital
copyrighted work results in a copy being transferred that may not be the
user's "particular copy," and although such disposition may implicate the
copyright owner's reproduction right, the Copyright Act must not be read
so narrowly as to disregard the first sale doctrine.
Another reason that the first sale doctrine arguably applies to digital
works is that the first sale doctrine focuses on the scope of the property
interest being transferred rather than "the nature of the land or chattel
that is the object of that property interest.""' That the record rental
amendment as codified in Section 109(b) of the Copyright Act distin-
guishes between ownership and possession by stating that the first sale
doctrine does not "extend to any person who has acquired possession of
the copy or phonorecord ... without acquiring ownership of it" supports
the contention that "the first sale doctrine applies according to the scope
of the property interest that has been transferred, rather than according to
the object of that interest.""' 2 Denying application of the first sale doc-
trine to a work that is rightfully owned merely because of its
embodiment as a digital object, therefore, is inconsistent with the spirit
of the first sale doctrine. " '
The final argument that the first sale doctrine should apply to digital
works is that the underlying objective of the first sale doctrine-to
facilitate the continued flow of copyrighted works throughout society-
should prevail over concerns about protecting intellectual property
rights. ' 4 The manner in which the first sale doctrine has been treated by
U.S. courts "has consistently reflected the belief that the public benefit
derived from the alienability of creative works outweighs the increased
incentive to create that would stem from granting authors perpetual
110. Id. at 158 (citing Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile Accessories
Co., 5 F.2d 411,411 (6th Cir. 1925).
111. Reply Comments of Library Associations, supra note 102.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Register's Report on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law (1961)
(explaining the purpose of public interest limitations on author's rights), reprinted in NIMMER,
supra note 20, at App. 14.
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control over copies of a work."' 5 Where the interests of copyright owners
and the public conflict, it has been recognized that "the public interest
must prevail."''1 6 As stated by the Supreme Court in Aiken,
[T]he immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair
return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by
this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general pub-
lic good. 'The sole interest of the United States and the primary
object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly,' this Court has
said, 'lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the
labors of authors.' When technological change has rendered its
literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in
light of this basic purpose."'
Copyright policy thus mandates application of the first sale doctrine
with respect to digital works." '8 At a minimum therefore, if the first sale
doctrine as drafted in the Copyright Act does not apply to digitized
works, some method of facilitating a first sale doctrine must be created.
c. The DMCA's Provisions Prohibit Application of
the First Sale Doctrine to Digital Works
Assuming that the first sale doctrine does apply to digital works,
were a shrink or click-wrap license deemed unenforceable, or were a
user able to successfully refuse to consent to such a license by clicking
the "Yes" box and subsequently sending notice to the software manufac-
turer that he reserves his rights under the Copyright Act, the DMCA
would further obstruct exercise of the first sale doctrine.
In response to modern technology and the corresponding concerns
about piracy in the digital era, Congress enacted the DMCA. By 1998,
the year of the DMCA's enactment, concerns arose that traditional copy-
right law would be rendered inadequate for the changing technological
landscape due to the public's growing use of the internet, digital media,
and personal computers capable of copying digital works."9 The DMCA
115. See id. (citing Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v. Arrow Drug, 233 E Supp. 881, 884
(E.D Pa. 1964); Blazon, Inc. v. Deluxe Game Corp., 268 F. Supp. 416, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 103.31 (1976) for the proposition
that "[after the first sale], the policy favoring a copyright monopoly for authors gives way to
the policy opposing restraints of trade and restraints on alienation."); C.M. Paula Co, v. Logan,
355 F. Supp. 189, 191 (N.D. Tex. 1973)).
116. Register's Report on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law (1961) (ex-
plaining the purpose of public interest limitations on author's rights), reprinted in NIMMER,
supra note 20, at App. 14.
117. Aiken, 286 U.S. at 156 (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
118. See Reply Comments of the Library Associations, supra note 102.
119. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21 (1998).
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"was designed to facilitate the robust development and world-wide ex-
pansion of electronic commerce, communications, research,
development, and education" by "mak[ing] digital networks safe places
to disseminate and exploit copyrighted materials' 0 The DMCA serves
"to advance two mutually supportive goals: the protection of intellectual
property rights in today's digital environment and the promotion of con-
tinued growth and development of electronic commerce."'
2'
In attempting to accomplish these objectives, the DMCA takes a
sweeping approach. Section 1201 of the DMCA, known as the "anti-
circumvention provision," prohibits copyright users from circumventing
technological measures controlling access to a copyrighted work.'22 Un-
der the DMCA, "to 'circumvent a technological measure' means to
descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or other-
wise avoid, bypass remove, deactivate, or impair a technological
measure, without the authority of the copyright owner."' 3
Section 1201 essentially divides technological measures into two
categories: "measures that prevent unauthorized access to a copyrighted
work and measures that prevent unauthorized copying of a copyrighted
work."' 24 With respect to the act of circumvention itself, Section 1201
permits the latter but prohibits the former. 25 The distinction between un-
authorized access and unauthorized copying attempts to preserve fair use
rights with respect to digital copyrighted works by permitting circum-
vention of anti-copying software to make back up copies.1
26
Although the DMCA does not expressly forbid exercise of fair use
with respect to digital works, its provisions render fair use functionally
infeasible. Digitized works contain anti-copying encryption software that
must be cracked in order to make a copy. 27 Section 1201 (a)(E)(2) of the
DMCA prohibits the making or selling of devices or services that are
used to circumvent access or anti-copying encryption if the devices or
services are primarily designed or produced to circumvent; have only
limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent; or they are marketed for use in circumventing. 8 Because
such devices or services cannot lawfully be provided, users wishing to
120. S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998).
121. H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 23 (1998).
122. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2001).
123. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A) (2001).
124. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, U.S. Copyright Office Summary,
Dec. 1998 at 3-4.
125. Id. at4.
126. Id.
127. Ken Arromdee, Reply Comments to DMCA Section 104 Report, at 4, available at
www.loc.gov/copyright/1201/comments/reply/056arromdee.pdf (Mar. 29, 2000).
128. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(E)(2) (2001).
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exercise their fair use rights and copy an encrypted digital work must do
so without enlisting the help of others. By virtue of the fact that few
consumers possess the necessary skills and willingness to write their
own decryption software, fair use is an illusory right under the DMCA.
Application of the DMCA to eBooks provides a striking illustration
of this phenomenon. When a user purchases an eBook, the file is stored
onto the hard drive of the computer used to download the file. Should the
user at any point wish to make a digital copy of the file or even print the
eBook out onto paper, Adobe's eBook Reader anti-copying software pre-
vents him from doing so. Although making a copy is perfectly legal
under the DMCA, the user will most likely lack the skills necessary to
crack the anti-copying mechanism. Barring the user's ability to find
some sort of illegal software that enables copying, the user cannot exer-
cise his fair use rights. The same is true with respect to software
programs installed on a computer. An unwitting consumer using a Win-
dows operating system, for example, would find that attempts to copy
the desired program by dragging the icon to the floppy drive results
merely in the shortcut to the program being copied rather than the soft-
ware itself.
In addition to preventing fair use, the DMCA's provisions frustrate
exercise of the first sale doctrine. Unlike digital works stored on portable
media such as CDs and DVDs that can be readily disposed, works resid-
ing on a computer's hard drive (such as an eBook or software program)
cannot be transferred without either transferring the actual computer or
making a copy of the work.29 In addition to the requirement that the
transferor have the ability to make a copy of the work, exercise of the
first sale doctrine also requires that the recipient of the work be able to
access the work once it is received. Assuming a user successfully hacks
the file's anti-copying software and then transfers the work, the DMCA
continues to prevent exercise of the first sale doctrine by prohibiting cir-
cumvention of the work's access control device.
Given that most if not all digital works that are sold (e.g., authorized
mp3s, e-books, and software) contain encryption devices that deny ac-
cess to anyone other than the purchaser, the recipient of a transferred
copy would lack authority to access it. In the case of an eBook, the
eBook cannot be read by the recipient unless the certificate to his reader
software matches that of the computer on which the eBook was
downloaded.'3° Software programs possess similar access restrictions,
129. See Kupferschmid, supra note 15, at 838.
130. See Adobe Acrobat eBook Reader Version 2.2 for Windows Read Me File; see also
Microsoft Reader 2.0 Activation FAQ, available at http://www.microsoft.com/reader/
pc-activation.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2002).
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requiring the input of a product key or code. Microsoft employs encryp-
tion called Product Activation with its Windows XP and Office XP
software that requires users to contact a Microsoft operated clearing-
house.'3 ' Once in touch with the user, the clearinghouse enables the user
to access the software by providing her with an installation ID that is tied
to her hardware configuration.' If users install the software without ob-
taining the installation ID from the clearinghouse, the software stops
working after 14 days has elapsed (or after the software is opened 50
times in the case of Office XP) and directs users to the clearinghouse's
internet site. 33 Were a user to transfer the software to a friend, therefore,
the clearinghouse would not recognize the friend's hardware configura-
tion and the encryption device would prevent the friend from accessing
the software.
Essentially, the DMCA eliminates the practical means by which the
fair use and first sale doctrines can be used in connection with many
digital works. For those that violate the DMCA's provisions, Congress
empowered the courts to impose both criminal and civil liability.3 4 Plain-
tiffs in a civil suit may seek temporary and permanent injunctions,
damages, recovery of costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and the destruc-
tion of any device or product involved in the violation that is in the
custody or control of the violator.'35 Defendants violating the DMCA
willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain face criminal penalties of up to $500,000 in fines and/or five years
imprisonment.3'
V. EFFECTS OF FRUSTRATING THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE
The incompatibility of the first sale doctrine with digital works en-
ables copyright owners to extend their rights beyond the first sale of a
digital work to preclude copyright users from reselling or transferring
digital works. As such, by employing copyright protection technology
that prevents copying and denies access to everyone but the original pur-
chaser, copyright owners can essentially remove used versions of the
digital work from the market, thereby forcing interested consumers to
131. Mary Jo Foley, Microsoft bolsters anti-piracy measures, CNET News.com, avail-
able at http://news.com.com/2009-1001-250936.html?legacy=cnet (Jan. 12, 2001).
132. Joe Wilcox, Microsoft's XP: Hardware changes a turnoff, CNET News.com, avail-
able at http://news.com.com/2100-1001-269085.html?legacy=cnet (June 27, 2001); Foley,
supra note 131.
133. Id.
134. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1203, 1204 (2001).
135. 17 U.S.C. § 1203 (2001).
136. 17 U.S.C. § 1204 (2001).
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purchase new versions of the digital work. Further, in the case of
Adobe's Acrobat eBook Reader software, the inability of a user to trans-
fer one eBook between multiple computer platforms may in some
instances result in users purchasing more than one copy.
As stated by Jack Valenti, the longtime president of the Motion Pic-
ture Association of America (the "MPAA"), "[i]f you can't protect what
you own, you don't own anything."'37 Microsoft shares this view, stating,
"[p]iracy is not a question of 'if,' but 'when.' No technology is immune
to it. The key is having a comprehensive plan in place to counter it at
every level and minimize the threat."3 Accordingly, the major film stu-
dios, record labels, and software firms encrypt all of their digital content.
The encryption methods used are extensive. For instance, the film
industry uses an encryption scheme known as the Contents Scrambling
System ("CSS"), which codes the data on a DVD such that it can only be
accessed using an authorized DVD player with a licensed descrambling
chip or software.'39 As a result, film studios can prevent DVDs containing
their content from being copied and can control the devices on which the
DVDs can be played. The music industry employs analogous technology
with respect to MP3s. Pursuant to the Secure Downloadable Music Ini-
tiative, an effort sponsored by a consortium of major record labels,
compliant MP3s are encrypted with watermarks that prevent copying
and control access.1
40
Encryption, restrictive licenses, and Section 1201 of the DMCA
have impacted commerce tremendously. Various groups of opponents to
the DMCA have set forth these concerns in the Copyright Office's Sec-
tion 104 Report. For instance, some assert that the market for used
DVDs is harmed by the inability to play DVDs on devices other than
those equipped with a CSS descrambling chip. 4' Being that playback is
possible only on such machines, users must purchase not only the DVD
itself, but also a special machine on which to play them.' 42 Were it not for
the DMCA's anti-circumvention provision, users could decode the CSS
system with an unauthorized decryption program that would enable the
DVDs to be accessed and viewed on devices other than authorized play-
137. Sam Allis, Internet Acts as Major Battleground Over Intellectual Property Rights,
Boston Globe, March 26, 2000.
138. Declan McCullagh, Memo on Microsoft's position on eBook encryption, anti-piracy
efforts (quoting Dick Brass, Vice President of eMerging Technologies, Microsoft), available at
http://www.politechbot.coin/p-02352.html (Aug. 6, 2001).
139. Arromdee, supra note 127, at 1.
140. See Clare Saliba, Digital Music Crackers Awarded Top Prize, NewsFactor Network,
at http://www.ecommercetimes.comiperl/story/5593.html (Nov. 30, 2000).




ers.13 Commentators argue the market for used DVDs is impaired be-
cause DVDs cannot be watched unless users also purchase a licensed
DVD player.'"
Similar concerns are presented by the film industry's region coding
of DVDs. 45 Region coding is a technological measure that prevents
DVDs manufactured for sale in one region of the world from playing on
a machine that was not manufactured for sale in the same region as the
DVD.146 DVDs manufactured for sale in the United States, for instance,
cannot play on a DVD player manufactured for sale in Japan. '7 Because
movie titles are released in the United States often exclusively and in
many cases prior to being released in other countries, consumers would
benefit substantially from the ability to purchase used DVDs released in
other countries. 48 The DMCA, however, prohibits the circumvention of
region coding that is necessary to view a DVD purchased in a foreign
country.
Frustration of the first sale doctrine due to licenses and the DMCA
has perhaps the most profound effect upon libraries. Due to the inability
to exercise first sale privileges with digital works, owners of digital
works stored in fixed media cannot donate them to libraries without do-
nating their entire computer or its hard drive. The only means by which
libraries can reasonably acquire donated works, therefore, is to rely on
donations of hard copies. Given the ease by which copyright users can
license a work online rather than traveling to a bricks and mortar store to
purchase a hard copy, and given the software industry's increasing use of
licenses, 49 however, the number of hard copies purchased is declining.'50
Every work licensed rather than purchased in hard-copy format corre-
spondingly reduces the pool of copyrighted works that can be donated to
libraries. Traditional donation channels, therefore, may logically subside
to a point of infeasibility for libraries such that libraries will be unable to
maintain a collection of current works large enough to support public
demand.' 5'
The inability to transfer digitized works also substantially impairs li-
brary lending to patrons and between libraries. Assuming that libraries
are able to acquire digital works, which under current law can only be
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Section 104 Report, supra note 4, at 35.
146. Id. at36
147. See id.
148. See Arromdee, supra note 127, at 3.
149. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
150. See Section 104 Report, supra note 4, at 42.
151. See id.
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done if the library purchases the work itself or receives a donation of the
hard drive on which the work is stored, use of the library's digital copy is
severely limited. Because of encryption restricting copying and access,
librarians cannot transfer works purchased online (e.g., an eBook) to
different computers within the same library or to computers in other li-
braries.'52 Absent a library's purchase of multiple copies of the work,
therefore, the material can be viewed only on the computer where the
work was initially downloaded. Loans to library patrons are therefore
impossible as are interlibrary loans."3
Copyright owners' use of licenses further complicates matters for li-
braries. Simply obtaining a license to use a digital work requires that
libraries be knowledgeable in license terms.'54 Libraries must also be
prepared to negotiate with publishers and other owners of copyrighted
content,' 55 thus forcing libraries to incur additional costs to consult with
or maintain sophisticated personnel knowledgeable with respect to such
negotiations. Moreover, license agreements often require payment of a
fee each time the work is accessed, thereby increasing the cost to librar-
ies of using digital works.5 6 Where libraries lack the ability to pay
license fees so that its patrons can access the work, some patrons may
have the means to pay for individual access while others may not, poten-
tially creating an informational divide.'57
Once licensed, use of the digital work is often severely limited. Li-
cense terms frequently prohibit the making of copies for archival and
preservation purposes.' 5 Whereas libraries make duplicate copies of
works that are rare or valuable, the need to make a back-up copy be-
comes particularly important with respect to works that a library owns in
digital form. Such works can be easily damaged by virus, user error or
system failure. License terms and encryption restricting copying and ac-
cess, however, render preservation impossible.5 9
Additionally, license terms often restrict the number of times that a
work can be accessed and limit access to patrons on the library premises,
152. See id. at 39.
153. See id.
154. Arnold P. Lutzger, Primer on the Digital Millennium: What the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act and the Copyright Tern Extension Act Mean for the Library Community, Asso-
ciation of Research Libraries Web Site, available at http://www.arl.org/info/frn/copy/
primer.html#part3 (last modified Mar. 8, 1999).
155. Id.
156. See Laura N. Gasaway, Values Conflict in the Digital Environment: Librarians Ver-
sus Copyright Holders, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 115, 134 (2000).
157. Id.
158. Id.; see also Section 104 Report, supra note 4, at 39; see also Lutzger, supra note
154.
159. See Gasaway, supra note 156, at 142.
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thus excluding offsite patrons.'6° Further, many licenses prohibit libraries
from retaining a hard copy after the license expires, thereby leaving li-
braries empty handed after paying expensive license fees. 6 '
Compounding the problem for libraries is copyright term extension
legislation that was enacted in the same year as the DMCA. Entitled the
"Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,'' 62 the legislation extends
copyright protection for covered works by an additional twenty years,
thereby prolonging the time it takes a work to enter the public domain.'
63
Because unrestricted access to non-copyrighted works is crucial to re-
search and scholarship, libraries face potentially severe impacts.'
6
4
In an effort to appease library interests, ,65 the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act provides an exception for libraries, reducing restric-
tions on copyrighted works during the last twenty years of the copyright
term.'66 In particular, libraries may copy, distribute, display and/or per-
form a work in digital or facsimile form for purposes of preservation,
scholarship, or research, provided the library determines on the basis of a
reasonable inquiry that the work is not subject to normal commercial
exploitation and that a copy or phonorecord cannot be obtained at a rea-
sonable price. 167 In addition, libraries are prohibited from exercising the
exception where the copyright owner or its agent provides notice through
the Copyright Office that the work is being exploited or can be obtained
at a reasonable price.' 68 This exception thus only partially addresses the
library community's interest in having works revert to the public domain
as quickly as possible. Functionally speaking, the only works copyright
owners will not exploit for the full copyright term will be those that are
unprofitable, which in all likelihood will be unpopular and of no interest
to the public anyway.' 69
160. See id. at 142, 154.
161. Id. at 142.
162. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2001).
163. Id. Copyrightable works now receive copyright protection for the life of the author
plus seventy years. Id. In the case of works made for hire the copyright term lasts the life of
the author plus ninety-five years. Id.
164. See Gasaway, supra note 156, at 123.
165. The libraries argued that while copyright owners rarely exploit works or make them
readily available in the marketplace during the last twenty years of the work's copyright term,
such works are of critical importance to scholars and researchers. Lutzger, supra note 154.
166. 17 U.S.C. § 108(h) (2001).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. As an additional matter, anti-copying and access-control software may "allow copy-
right owners to control use and disposition of copies of digital works long after the copyrights
have passed into the public domain." Reply Comments of Library Associations, supra note
102.
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In aggregate, the DMCA's provisions combined with the use of re-
strictive licenses impede commerce substantially. In addition to
consumers being unable to sell or transfer software and eBooks, libraries
bear a substantial portion of this impediment by failing to readily enjoy
the benefits that digital technology has to offer. Being that libraries are
one of the segments of commerce standing to benefit substantially from
modern technology, the incompatibility of the first sale doctrine with
digital works poses an ironic twist. The use of digital works such as
eBooks could save libraries considerable time and money in that works
could be more cheaply and easily stored, retrieved and distributed to li-
brary patrons. As is, however, use of eBooks is prohibitively
cumbersome, expensive, and impractical due to encryption software and
the DMCA's anticircumvention rules. Moreover, licensing digital works
such as periodicals often requires libraries to submit to overly restrictive
terms that render use of the digital work cost ineffective.
VI. MAKING A DIGITAL FIRST SALE EXCEPTION FEASIBLE
The first step towards creating a digital first sale doctrine is to amend
the Copyright Act so that confusion is resolved as to whether such an
exception exists. As noted by one commentator, "[t]he public interest
and the evolution of the marketplace often are better served by laws that
clearly address and define the rules for a new technological environ-
ment."'7 The amendment must make it perfectly clear that the first sale
doctrine applies to copyrighted works irrespective of the media in which
they are fixed, whether it be digitized media, traditional print media, or
other media. As proposed by the Library Associations, Section 109(a) of
Title 17 of the United States Code should be amended as follows:
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of
a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title,
or the owner of any right of access to the copyrighted work, or
any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the au-
thority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession of that copy, phonorecord, or right of access.7'
As a companion to a Copyright Act amendment, technological
measures must be developed to enable copying and transmission of digi-
tal works while preventing piracy. To this end, several objectives must be
achieved. First, the measures taken must preserve the balance between
170. Reply Comments of the Digital Media Association, available at http://
www.loc.gov/copyright/reports/studies/dmca/reply/Reply016.pdf (Sept. 5, 2000).
171. Reply Comments of Library Associations, supra note 102.
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copyright owners and copyright users that the first sale doctrine has tra-
ditionally attempted to establish. Tipping the scale in either direction, as
we have experienced with the DMCA's favorable treatment of copyright
owners, can have dramatic economic and social effects.
The second objective that must be achieved is that the measures
taken must be commercially feasible. In other words, software that fur-
thers the spirit of the first sale doctrine must not be so expensive that it
adversely affects the demand for the copyrighted work itself. Doing so
would undermine the incentive to create original works and reduce the
market for used works. At the extreme, prohibitively expensive techno-
logical measures intended to protect copyright owners' rights could
result in a market shift away from digitized works back to traditional
hard copies.
Finally, technological measures must provide sufficient assurance to
copyright owners that piracy will not occur. Because copyright owners
bear all risks of piracy that could potentially ensue if the new techno-
logical measures fail, copyright owners will simply refuse to adopt the
measures unless such assurance is obtained. The measures must there-
fore be developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners
and other relevant industry representatives so that copyright owners feel
confident in the technology.'
A. The Simultaneous Destruction Proposal
One proposal aimed at facilitating a digital-first sale doctrine is the
concept of simultaneous destruction. Representatives Boucher and
Campbell proposed this idea to the 105th Congress in H.R. 3048. 73 As
the name implies, the simultaneous destruction method requires that the
person transmitting the copyrighted work immediately erase his particu-
lar copy after the transfer is complete. 7 4 The rationale underlying this
proposal "is that by destroying the source copy, the conduct more closely
resembles a traditional distribution (to which the first sale exception
would apply) because the same number of copies exist at the end of the
transaction as at the beginning of the transaction."'
75
172. See Section 104 Report, supra note 4, at App. 9, 59.
173. Digital Era Copyright Enhancement Act, H.R. 3048, 105th Congress (1st
Sess. 1997).
174. See Ken Wasch, SIIA Reply Comments Relating to the Joint Study by the Copy-
right Office and NTIA on Sections 109 and 117 of the Copyright Act (letter from Ken Wasch,
President of Software and Information Industry Association, to Jesse Felder and Jeffrey E.M.
Joyner, Senior Counsel, National Telecommunications and Information Adminstration), avail-
able at http://www.siia.net/sharedcontent/govt/issues/ip/9-5-00.html (Sept. 5, 2000).
175. Id.
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While this proposal follows the spirit of the first sale doctrine as it
has traditionally been applied, it is potentially impractical due to piracy
concerns. First, it ignores some of the characteristics of digital media
that could result in used works competing directly with new versions of
the same work even if the source copy were simultaneously destroyed.'76
Whereas the quality of a book or analog cassette deteriorates over time,
the integrity of digital content remains perfect throughout the life of the
work irrespective of how many times it is read or transferred.'" Consum-
ers will thus be indifferent between purchasing a new copy of the work
and obtaining a used copy.' For example, when a particular copy of a
paper back book is continually read and then sold to used bookstores,
there reaches a point in the chain of transfer where "the integrity and
appearance of the paperback becomes so deficient that the next reader in
line will opt to purchase a 'new' copy of the same paperback."'
79
The innate ability of digital works to remain in "mint" condition
over time potentially pushes the boundaries of the traditional first sale
doctrine by enabling users to enjoy a digital work for an indefinite pe-
riod of time rather than a limited one.' 80 At the extreme, one copy of a
work could be passed between every user who demanded it, thus poten-
tially serving the entire market for that work. 8'
This concern becomes particularly prevalent with respect to peer-to-
peer technology, such as Napster or Gnutella. Such software provides a
centralized exchange for file swapping and enables users from all over
the world to meet online, search each other's hard drives for a desired
file, and then upon locating it, download the file.'82 Using peer-to-peer
software "permits one copy of a work potentially to serve millions" in
that the work can be copied and shared with an innumerable quantity of
users. 3 Few copyright owners would derive income from their works if
the market for copyrighted works became usurped by a handful of copies
transferred between an infinite quantity of users.'
84
Further, the simultaneous-destruction proposal is impractical be-
cause it does not address the potential for widespread distribution of
copied digital works.'85 The impact of the first sale doctrine on the mar-
176. Kupferschmid, supra note 15, at 848.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. Wasch, supra note 174.
180. See id.
181. Id.
182. See generally Webopedia, at http://www.webopedia.com/ (last visited Dec. 1,
2002).





ket for the original work has historically been limited by virtue of the
fact that distribution of traditional media "was restricted by the geogra-
phy and circle of people known to the holder of that copy, as well as the
time and effort necessary to re-distribute the copy.'' 1 6 Such constraints,
however, do not apply to digitized works.'87 Digitized works, unlike hard
copies (or digital works fixed in hard copy media such as CDs or DVDs),
can be effortlessly re-distributed anywhere around the world to millions
of people unknown to the user.'88 As a result, the number of times that a
perfect copy of the digitized work is transferred between parties would
increase dramatically. Millions of consumers would no longer have the
need or the desire to purchase the original work. 89 Accordingly, the mar-
ket for the original work would suffer substantial impairment. 9 '
Perhaps of greatest concern are the evidentiary and procedural con-
cerns presented by the simultaneous destruction proposal.'9' First,
barring any technological improvements, there is no way of verifying
that a user destroyed his source copy upon transferring a copy. 92 Sec-
ondly, even if there was a way of proving that the source copy was
discarded, it is impossible for the courts or the copyright owner to verify
that it was done so simultaneously.'9 Thus, copyright users could freely
distribute pirated copies of the work and then upon being discovered
dispose of the original copies in order to claim the first sale defense at
trial. '14
B. Accommodating the Simultaneous Destruction Proposal
The simultaneous destruction proposal, in effect, bridges the gap
created by applying the traditional first sale doctrine to modern technol-
ogy. Although the proposal presents piracy concerns, it embodies the
fundamental approach of the first sale doctrine. Were piracy concerns
associated with the simultaneous destruction proposal addressed, there-
fore, the first sale doctrine as applied to digital works could successfully
mesh with traditional copyright law.
Technological measures must resolve these piracy concerns. Essen-
tially, a technological device must destroy or render the transferor's




189. See Kupferschmid, supra note 15, at 848.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 845.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Wasch, supra note 174.
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transferred. For instance, if the device detects that transmission of a copy
of the work from the original computer to an external source is in pro-
gress, the device would instantaneously destroy the original copy and all
other copies residing on the computer's hard drive upon completion of
the transfer. In other words, the device would permit "file copy" but
would be triggered to delete all remaining copies upon "file move."
In determining what constitutes an external source, this classification
should be constructed very broadly, such that copies moved to any loca-
tion other than the computer's own hard drive would trigger the
simultaneous destruction device. For instance, if a copy has been moved
to a floppy disk, CD-ROM, or has left the computer via e-mail or by
means of peer-to-peer software, then the device would begin destroying
the original and all copies residing on the transmitting computer.
C. A Central Registration System for Digital Copyrighted Works
Another technological means of facilitating a digital first sale doc-
trine is the use of a registration system that records both the serial
number of the work and the serial number of the computer's processor
used to open the file. To use the digital work, a user would log on to the
system whereupon the registry would check to make sure that the serial
number of the work matches the processor number. Upon making this
determination, the system would then grant the user an access key to
view, play or use the work.
Upon transferring the work, the recipient would register with the
registration web site, which would link the new user's processor identifi-
cation number to the serial number of the work. The registration system
would then replace the old user with the new user, in effect transferring
the old user's right of access to the recipient such that the transferor
would no longer be able to use the work.
To avoid the inconvenience of having to log on to the internet each
time a user wished to use the work, a short-term access key could be
used. This key would degrade after a certain number of uses or after a
specified period of time has elapsed.'95 If a user transferred the work dur-
ing the active period under such a system, the access key to the work
would soon expire anyway, thus creating a near simultaneous destruc-
tion. If the original user wished to continue use of the work after the key
expired, he would simply log on to the internet and obtain an extension.
195. Microsoft employs a similar scheme with Windows XP and Office XP. See discus-
sion infra Part IV.B.c.
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D. Preservation/Restoration of Fair Use With Digital Works
For simultaneous destruction software or a registration scheme to fa-
cilitate the transfer of copies, copyright owners would first need to lift
copyright protection devices that prohibit copying. While in the past,
copyright owners have feared that the ability to copy works would result
in piracy, effective technological measures would alleviate these con-
cerns. With simultaneous destruction software, piracy would not be an
issue if the original copy and all duplicate copies residing on a user's
computer are destroyed once a single copy is transferred. The quantity of
copies that a user could make, therefore, would bear no relation to the
quantity that could be distributed. A registration system would likewise
alleviate concerns about copying, since copies could not be accessed by
more than one user per ownership period. Copyright owners should thus
have no qualms with permitting a user to exercise fair use rights pro-
vided the copyrighted work were protected by a simultaneous
destruction device or registry system.
Assuming copyright owners removed anti-copying software, exer-
cise of the fair use doctrine with digital works would require that the
new technological measures permit users to make at least one back-up
copy of the digital work on removable media (e.g., CD-ROM or floppy
disk). To protect against piracy, the technological measures would need
to detect that a user was making a back-up copy.
In the case of simultaneous destruction software, upon making the
determination that a back-up copy had been made, the software would
encrypt the back-up copy with traditional anti-copying software. This
encryption would prevent the user from making further generational cop-
ies. After one back-up copy was made, the simultaneous destruction
software would then proceed to destroy or disable all copies (but for the
encrypted back up copy if it were made onto the computer's hard drive)
if any copy were subsequently moved from the computer's hard drive. A
registration system would work in a similar fashion, providing a unique
access key for use only with that particular back-up copy. Combined
with anti-copying software embedded in the back-up copy, copying and
access to the copy would be restricted.
E. Special Measures for Libraries
Making a digital first sale doctrine feasible for libraries and suitable
for copyright owners requires special technological measures. Unlike
consumers, who upon transfer of a work usually do not intend to receive
the work back at any point in the future, libraries transfer works to pa-
trons only temporarily. During the course of this temporary transfer,
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libraries run the risk that patrons may steal, damage, or expose the li-
brary's copy of the digital work to virus while the work is checked out.
Simultaneous destruction software appropriate for consumers would
therefore not work for libraries.
So as to minimize the effect of library operations upon the retail
market for original works, technological measures must preserve the
manner in which the first sale doctrine has traditionally applied to library
operations. In particular, several attributes of traditional library lending
must be carried forward in the lending of digitized works. First, the in-
tegrity and appearance of books over time degrade. A library's
ownership of a book, therefore, does not extend indefinitely. At a certain
point in time, which is dependent upon the extent of use, libraries will
replace a worn-out work with a new copy that has either been purchased
or donated. Digitized versions of a work, however, can last forever such
that the digitized version could theoretically undermine the market for
the original work in perpetuity. Copies of digital works sold directly to
libraries, therefore, should be programmed to self-destruct after a prede-
termined time that is roughly commensurate with the life of a hard copy
of the book. In the alternative, prices of works sold to libraries could be
increased to reflect increased usage.1
96
Second, the number of times that the hard copy of a book can be
checked out in a given time period is limited by the fact that only one
person at a time can check out a single copy. As a result of this scarcity,
library lending does not flood the market with free versions of the work
that can be accessed by anyone at any time. Consequently, patrons desir-.
ing to use a work immediately rather than waiting for the library's copy
to become available will purchase it.
Were libraries permitted to lend out multiple digital copies to a large
number of patrons by mere virtue of the fact that they held the source
copy, a potentially endless supply of free versions of the work would
exist such that nobody would want to purchase a new version. One could
envision a situation where consumers, rather than purchasing the most
recent John Grisham eBook instead merely paid a visit to the library,
where a copy was guaranteed to be waiting for the consumer. Legal or
technological measures must therefore require that libraries can only
lend only one copy at a time.
196. To compensate for increased usage by library patrons, works licensed to libraries
typically require payment of a fee each time the work is accessed. See Arnold P. Lutzger, In
the Curl of the Wave: What the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Term Extension Act
Mean for the Library and Education Community, Association of Research Libraries Bi-




Because libraries and universities lend works out to the public, an
additional window for piracy is opened. Note that a library patron
merely possesses a work when he checks it out from the library. The pa-
tron thus lacks the requisite "ownership" to exercise the first sale
doctrine. As a result, he cannot lawfully transfer the work without in-
fringing the copyright owner's distribution right. Further, any copies
made would violate the copyright owner's reproduction right. Techno-
logical measures must therefore prohibit both copying and transfer of the
work while in the patron's possession.
F. Enforcement of Technological Measures
Whatever technological methods were employed to enable exercise
of first sale privileges with digital works, be it a registration system, si-
multaneous destruction measures, and/or special technological devices
for libraries, the DMCA as currently drafted would protect against the
circumvention of these measures. Because the measures would serve to
prevent mass transfer of digital works and protect copyright by restrict-
ing access, the measures would fall under Section 1201's definition of a
"technological measure" controlling access to a copyrighted work.' 97 As
such, users or library patrons that hacked the technological measures
controlling access would face civil and criminal liability.' 98
Anti-copying devices imposed on back-up copies for consumers and
checked-out copies for library patrons would likewise receive sufficient
protection from the DMCA. Although the DMCA permits users to crack
anti-copying encryption to make a fair use copy, '99 a majority of consum-
ers lack the necessary skills to do so. Those having such skills are
prohibited by the DMCA from providing devices or services that facili-
tate circumvention of anti-copying software."
VII. CONCLUSION
Technological advances provoke changes in society and affect our
every day lives.'O° Such advances shape how we as a society consume
goods and services in the marketplace and can ultimately influence how
we as individuals interact with each other. These changes "generate de-
mand for new legal regimes" capable of protecting rights traditionally
197. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B) (2001).
198. 17 U.S.C §§ 1203, 1204 (2001).
199. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)(A) (2001).
200. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2001).
201. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 21, at 44.
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recognized."' Copyright law, in particular, has always been forced to
adapt to developments in the technological status quo that have rendered
its current structure inapplicable to current circumstances.03 Although
the DMCA Section 104 Report concludes by recommending that Con-
gress not alter Section 109 of the Copyright Act,2' 4 the perpetual
evolution of Copyright law must continue with respect to the first sale
doctrine.
As the quantity of content released in digital form increases, absence
of a digital first sale doctrine will result in substantial harm not only to
consumers and the market for used copyrighted works, but also to own-
ers of copyrightable works themselves. Stated insightfully by one
industry commentator,
[Consumers] have for decades bought physical CDs, bought
physical books, and have been able to do with them as they
wish. When a time comes, and we hope the time never comes
that a consumer bumps smack up against a restriction imposed
on them because the first sale doctrine was not updated, there is
going to be a tremendous human cry and the human cry is not
necessarily going to be first to Congress. It's going to be a back-
lash against e-commerce companies that are selling them
something that they think is insufficient, inadequate, and does
not deliver to them the full value and flexibility that they expect
from CDs, from books, and from hard copies of goods, as well
as from digital media which inherently people view as being
more flexible and capable.0 5
Through a combination of legislative amendment and development
of technological measures protecting copyright owners' rights, a first
sale doctrine must be applied in the digital era. After all, given the re-
strictions associated with eBook use, most consumers would likely opt




204. The Report states, "[i]n the final analysis .... harm to the market as a result of the
ease of distribution, and the lessened deterrent effect of the law that could promote piracy,
outweigh the pro-competitive gains that might be realized from the creations of a digital first
sale doctrine." Section 104 Report, supra note 4, at 100.
205. Seth Greenstein, Digital Media Associates, Summaries of Testimony of Nov. 29,
2000 Public Hearing, Copyright Office Hearing Transcript, at 268-269, available at
http://www.loc.gov/copyright/reports/studies/dmca/sec- I 04-report-vol-3.pdf (last visited Dec.
1,2002).
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